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We consider an information reconciliation protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD). In order
to correct down the error rate, we suggest a method, which is based on symmetric blind information
reconciliation for the low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. We develop a subsequent verification
protocol with the use of -universal hash functions, which allows verifying the identity between the
keys with a certain probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
A paradigmatic problem of cryptography is the prob-
lem of key distribution [1]. Widely used tools for key dis-
tribution, based on so-called public key cryptography, use
an assumption of the complexity of several mathemati-
cal problems such as integer factorization [2] and discrete
logarithm [3]. However, a large-scale quantum computer
would allow solving such tasks in a more efficient manner
in compare with their classical counterparts using Shor’s
algorithm [4]. Therefore, most of information protection
tools are vulnerable to attacks with the use of quantum
algorithms. It should be also noted that absence of effi-
cient non-quantum algorithms breaking public key tools
remains unproved.
In the view of appearance of large-scale quantum com-
puters, the crucial task is to develop a quantum-safe in-
frastructure for communications. Crucial components of
such an infrastructure are information-theoretically se-
cure schemes, which make no computational assump-
tions [1]. Examples of these schemes are the one-time-pad
encryption [5–7] and Wegman-Carter authentication [8].
Nevertheless, the need for establishing shared secret sym-
metric keys between communicating parties invites the
challenge of how to securely distribute keys.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an elegant
method for key establishment between distant users (Al-
ice and Bob), without relying on insecure public key al-
gorithms [9]. During last decades, remarkable progress in
theory, experimental study, and technology of QKD has
been performed [10]. However, realistic error rates in the
sifted key using current technologies are of the order of a
few percent, which is high for direct applications [9–11].
Practical QKD then include a post-processing procedure,
which is based on the framework of the classical informa-
tion theory.
In this work, we focus on an information reconciliation
task in QKD. We consider a method for error correction
based on symmetric blind information reconciliation [12]
with low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [15, 16]. In
order to check the identity between the keys after the er-
ror correction step, we develop a subsequent verification
protocol with the use of -universal hash functions [20].
We note that the additional procedures (privacy amplifi-
cation and authentication) are necessary to obtain secure
keys shared only by Alice and Bob [11–14].
The present paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we describe the symmetric blind information reconcilia-
tion technique for the low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes. In Sec. III, we suggest a subsequent verification
protocol with the use of -universal hash functions, which
allows one to verify the identity between the keys with
a certain probability. In Sec. IV, we give estimations for
the information leakage in the suggested information rec-
onciliation protocol. We summarize the main results of
our work in Sec. V
II. SYMMETRIC BLIND ERROR
CORRECTION
We suggest the protocol for information reconciliation
which has two essential steps: the symmetric blind error
correction (SBEC) procedure and the subsequent veri-
fication protocol. For the SBEC technique, a block of
the sifted key is divided into Nsb sub-blocks of length
nsb, and all sub-blocks are treated in parallel. All the
resulting sub-blocks from SBEC are input data for the
subsequent verification procedure. If it is necessary dur-
ing the verification protocol the keys are divided into
the same sub-blocks once again for determining the sub-
blocks which contain an error (for details, see Fig. 1).
Let us consider the SBEC procedure for the particular
sub-blocks of the sifted key kAsift and k
B
sift of length nsb
owned by Alice and Bob. For details of the SBEC proce-
dure we refer the reader to Ref. [12], and here we confine
ourself with explanation of the main steps.
For the implementation of the SBEC procedure we con-
sider a set (“pool”) of nine LDPC codes [15, 16] with the
following rates:
R = {0.9, 0.85, . . . , 0.5}, (1)
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Figure 1. Scheme of the information reconciliation protocol:
First, the block of the sifted key is split in sub-blocks which
are treated with SBEC in parallel. Second, all the sub-blocks
go all together through the verification step.
and the frame length nfr. The parity-check matrices of
these codes can be generated with the use of the improved
progressive edge growing algorithm [17] according to gen-
erating polynomials from Ref. [18].
The implementation of the SBEC procedure consists
of following steps.
0) This initial step of the SBEC procedure realizes
the preliminary initialization. The parties initialize
zero strings e of length nfr.
1) Parties implement the rate adaptation. Alice (Bob)
extend their sub-blocks of the sifted key k
A(B)
sift of
length
nsb := 0.95nfr (2)
with nshrt shortened and npnct punctured symbols,
where nshrt := dh(qest)nfr − nsb(1 − R)e, npnct :=
∆next−nshrt. Here, d·e stands for ceiling operation,
h(·) is the binary entropy function,
∆next := 0.05nfr (3)
is the total number of shortened and punctured
symbols, and the code rate R is chosen among R
in such a way that both nshrt and npnct are non-
negative for current estimation of the QBER qest.
The positions for punctured symbols are chosen ac-
cording untainted puncturing technique [19], while
the positions for shortened symbols are chosen
pseudo-randomly. We denote the list of positions
with sifted key bits as Ω.
2) This step is the realization of the syndromes ex-
change. Alice and Bob exchange with syndromes
sA(B) := k
A(B)
ext H
T
R, where HR is the parity-check
matrix corresponded to code rate R (k
A(B)
ext and
sA(B) are treated as row-vectors; T stands for
transposition). All the summations in vector ma-
trix multiplication are assumed to be performed by
modulo 2.
3) Alice and Bob use belief propagation decoding.
The parties apply syndrome decodings based on
the belief propagation algorithm with log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) [12]. As the input both the parties
use the “relative syndrome” ∆s = sA ⊕ sB , cur-
rent information about error pattern e (note, that
it was initialized as zero string in the beginning if
the procedure), parity-check matrix HR, the esti-
mated QBER qest, and current positions of short-
ened and punctured symbols (⊕ stands for mod-
ulo 2 summation). If the algorithm converges, it
returns the new value of the error pattern e, and
then Alice calculates the corrected key as follows:
kAcor := k
A
ext[Ω] ⊕ e[Ω], where Ω is the list of posi-
tions of sifted key symbols in the extended key. Bob
assumes his corrected key has the following form:
kBcor := k
B
sift. The SBEC is finished.
4) If the belief propagation algorithm does not con-
verge, the this step is applied. It is based on disclos-
ing additional information as follows. The parties
take d := d56−40Re positions in the extended key,
which has the minimal magnitudes of LLR values
to the end of belief propagation algorithm, disclose
the values of their extended keys in these positions,
and mark these positions as shortened. Then the
parties update their error patterns e in the newborn
shortened positions, and go to the Step 3.
There is still a certain probability that uncorrected er-
rors remain after the SBEC procedure. In order to detect
remaining errors, we implement the subsequent verifica-
tion protocol, which is described below.
III. VERIFICATION
Here we suggest the verification protocol based on us-
ing the following -universal family of hash functions [20]:
hk(X) := inttostr
[
n∑
i=1
strtoint(xi)k
i−1 mod p
]
, (4)
where k ∈ F ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1} is a randomly chosen
key for the universal hashing, p is the prime number, X is
a binary string of an arbitrary length, (x1‖x2‖ . . . ‖xn) :=
X is a partition of the string into substrings xi of length
lp = blog2 pc (b·c stands for floor operation), inttostr and
strtoint are functions performing conversion between in-
teger values an binary strings.
It can be shown [20] that the collision probability of
the hash function (4) (i.e. the probability that hk(X) =
hk(Y ) for some X 6= Y and random k) is given by fol-
lowing expression: (l) ≤ (dl/lpe−1)/p, where l is length
of X. Below the verification protocol based on the con-
sidered family of universal hash functions is considered.
Consider blocks of the corrected keys K
A(B)
cor owned
by Alice (Bob), which consist of nb = Nsb × nsb bits.
The implementation of the suggested verification proto-
col consists of following steps.
31) On the initial step of the verification protocol, the
parties use generation of the key for universal hash-
ing. Alice generate a random number k ∈ F using
a true random generator (TRNG).
2) Further, the calculation of the hash for the whole
block on the Alice side is realized. Alice computes
hk(K
A
cor) and sends it Bob together with k.
3) This step is comparing the hashes for the whole
block Bob computes hk(K
B
cor) and compares it with
hk(K
A
cor). If the hashes are identical, then Bob
sends the acknowledgement message to Alice. The
parties then assume K
A(B)
ver := K
A(B)
cor , and the pro-
tocol finishes. Here K
A(B)
sift are blocks owned by
Alice (Bob). If the hashes are different, then Bob
sends the negative-acknowledgement message, and
the protocol continues.
4) Computing the hashes for all the sub-blocks on the
Alice side is Step 4. Alice splits the corrected key
KAcor in Nsb sub-blocks {kAcor,i} of length nsb, gen-
erates Nsb random keys {ki} belonging to F, cal-
culates {hki(kAcor,i)}, and sends both these sets to
Bob.
5) Comparing the hashes for all the sub-block is used
as the final step. Bob computes his versions of
hashes {hki(kBcor,i)}, compares them with corre-
sponding values from Alice, and discard the sub-
blocks with mismatched hashes from his corrected
key KBcor, to obtain the verified key K
B
ver. Then
he sends Alice the indices of unverified block, and
she perform the same operation and the protocol
finishes.
To estimate a probability of the remaining error in the
verified keys consider a worst case scenario where all of
Nsb sub-blocks contain errors after SBEC procedure. In
this case, the probability of at least hash collision is given
by the following expression:
ver ≤ (nb) + [1− (nb)]
[
1− (1− (nsb))Nsb
]
. (5)
Here the first term is a probability of collision for the
whole block, and the second term is a probability of at
least one collision in the verification of all the sub-blocks
in the case of different hashes of the whole blocks . We
note that the initial processing of the whole blocks KAcor
and KBcor is performed to minimize the leakage of the
information via public discussion. Let the frame error
rate (FER), that is a probability of remaining error af-
ter SBEC in each of the sub-blocks, to be equal to F .
Then the information leakage in the verification step, ne-
glecting the hash collision event, is given by the following
expression:
leakverec = (1− F )Nsb lht+
+
[
1− (1− F )Nsb] (Nsb + 1)lht, (6)
where
lht = dlog2 pe (7)
is a hash length. In Eq. (6) the first term corresponds
to the case, where the whole blocks are identical and
only one verification hash is transfered. The second term
corresponds to the case of at least one error, where addi-
tional Nsb hashes are transfered.
IV. ESTIMATIONS
Let us consider our protocol based on a set of LDPC
codes of frame length nfr = 4000 and code rates given by
Eq. (1). According to Eq. (3) and Eq. (2) the number
of sifted key bit processed in each sub-block is nsb =
3800. Taking the number of sub-blocks Nsb = 256 and
the prime number for universal hashing p = 250−27 with
hash length lht = 50 bit, we obtain the following bound
on a probability of the verification fail: ver ≤ 2× 10−11.
Let us then consider a question about information leak-
age in the verification step. Assuming that the FER
of SBEC is F = 10−5, we obtain the following result:
leakverec ≈ 1.65lht ≈ 83 bit.
In order to compare our approach with currently avail-
able post-processing tools, we calculate the information
leakage for the setups described in Ref. [21]. We note
that in this case the hashes are added to each processed
LDPC code block. Therefore, one has the following esti-
mation: leakver,altec ≈ nlht = 12 800 bit.
It is thus clearly seen that the suggested approach has
an advantage in leakver,altec /leak
ver
ec ≈ 155 times. Thus,
the suggested information reconciliation protocol allows
one to decrease the information leakage in the verification
protocol significantly.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented the information reconciliation pro-
tocol which combines two approaches: SBEC, based on
LDPC codes, and verification, based on -universal hash-
ing. We have shown that applying SBEC for a number
of sub-blocks in parallel and performing verification for
the general block allows significant decreasing the infor-
mation leakage in the verification stage.
The presented procedure allows one to obtain identical
keys from sifted keys with a known bound of an error
probability, which depends on the particular parameters
of the protocol, such as hash length, block length, and
number of sub-blocks.
The open source proof-of-principle realization of the
presented algorithms are available [13, 14].
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